### 1NC 1

#### Organizing a more just society should be the primary goal of modern politics – the meticulously economic focus of energy system hamstrings our ability to accomplish this goal and destroys the biosphere and causes global war

**Dahm and Bannas 2011** (Daniel, Stephen, “The decline of the Fossil Age is the rise of distributive justice” <http://poldev.revues.org/835>)

The many cultures of the world today face a huge challenge: the organisation of a sustainable and just society, which enables people to have a share in the essentials of life, in knowledge and political and cultural development, as well as access to and the use of technological infrastructure. Sustainable development demands more than simply maintaining and protecting the climatic and ecological balance of the bio-geosphere; it requires a constructive effort to enable and promote the evolution of living things and the cooperative development of the diversity of the Earth’s cultural forms as a complement to bio-ecological evolution. In the co-evolution of humanity, economics has taken on an increasingly significant interface function with relation to nature. Economics mediates between the ideas, needs and demands of human culture and social reality on the one hand, and natural resources on the other. The role of energy availability has become ever more important as a result of industrialisation and the increasing tendency to use material and technological methods for economic production. Energy became the means and the motor of economic development. Its availability and access to it increased in significance for the development of industry, wealth and the creation of infrastructure. Many alternative cultural forms had already been marginalised and consigned to history, and many geographical areas had already been restructured to become suppliers of resources for transport to the booming western European-style societies. Together with an increasing shift in the orientation of models of prosperity from “being” to “having” (cp. Fromm, 1976) and the expansion of the consumer goods industry necessary for this, energy availability and energy use became entrenched as a prerequisite for prosperity. Energy transformed ideas and wishes into material goods and legitimised the conception that everything was endlessly feasible. At the start of the 21st century, energy is the source, the prerequisite and the legitimation of the model of power and consumption of the last century. However, there is neither the material basis nor the energy availability for us to pursue further, and around the globe, the resource-hungry and energy-hungry lifestyle of the past decades. This lifestyle never brought happiness (cp. Kasser, 2002). It could never be achieved throughout the world. Today, energy no longer embodies the genie from the bottle, who works wonders, but rather a model for limitless economic growth, material excess and the accumulation of economic, social and political power by one group at the expense of the others. Energy is frequently seen as being synonymous with the climatic and ecological crisis, with greenhouse gases, global injustice and military conflicts. At the same time, though, energy today once again represents hope. The age of renewable energy has dawned and, with its potential for decentralised production, its polycentric supply infrastructure and ecological balance, it represents a new technological age. Renewable energy gives new strength to ideas of good governance, of justice, participation and stewardship of our social goods.

#### The belief in an entirely controllable and regulatable natural world causes extinction

**Dahm and Bannas 2011** (Daniel, Stephen, “The decline of the Fossil Age is the rise of distributive justice” <http://poldev.revues.org/835>)

The biosphere and geosphere exist in close dynamic interdependency. Their relational structure is gaining degrees of complexity whose causal relatedness is far beyond analytical objectivity. In particular, linear determinisms – still common in most scientific analyses – are reaching their limits. The fundamental uncertainty of ecological interdependencies and processes is multiplying within the cultural dimensions of the anthroposphere. Human value concepts and interpretations of reality (lat. res = thing) are becoming bio-ecological and climate ecological parameters. Economic and political strategies are directly affecting the geo-bio-ecological budgets, material and energy flows, accumulation, distribution and the ecological balance – in space as well as in time. 2The wide range of life-threatening conflicts today range from the destructive climate impacts by greenhouse gases as CO2, Methane and others and the atmospheric enrichment with particulate matter, up to the extensive degradation and desertification of soils and landscapes worldwide, the far-reaching pollution and exhaustion of water resources as well as the wasteful use of fossil resources, to the systematic destruction of marine and land ecosystems, and the rapid extinction of the wide variety of life forms. Humans are rarely able to understand clearly the complex chains of cause and effect, but we know that humans play a decisive role in these processes. But much easier to link directly to human behaviour and the human world of ideas is the broad spectrum of severe, destructive and far-reaching conflicts that humanity is facing daily. 3The only field in which humans are able to interact and communicate with their ecological environment is that of “culture”. It is only through culture that human-nature-relations are interpreted and strategically translated and realised. By means of cultures of knowledge, of economics, politics, social and civil relations, etc., humans set limits and openings for their position in “the world”, and their patterns of actions and opportunities. [2. The human-nature-relation: an epistemological disconnect](http://poldev.revues.org/835#tocfrom1n2) 4Scientifically this relationship represents one of the most fundamental epistemological (of the theory of cognition) schisms in history: the contact between a materialistic view of reality and the immaterial “Wirklichkeit” of a living world in dynamic interdependency. “The insights of modern physics – of quantum physics – suggest a new interpretation of the world that carries us beyond the materialistic-mechanistic worldview. Instead of the world assumed until now – a mechanical, temporally determined “reality” of objectifiable things, the real Wirklichkeit (a world that effects) turns out to be basically “potentiality”: an indivisible, immaterial, temporally essentially indeterminate and genuinely creative bonding of relations that determines only “can”-probabilities, a differentiated potential for a material-energetic realization.” (Dürr, Dahm & Lippe, 2005) Such a “schism” cannot be resolved (as historically expected for a long time in the development of the sciences particularly in the philosophies) primarily by means of a change in our spiritual relationship to our world. Rather, and more drastically, humanity is confronted with this epistemological schism through its interaction with the living world, which both includes and borders humanity. The scenarios of bio-geo-ecological crises present human beings in a life-threatening way with the narrowness of their interpretations of the world and of their patterns of behaviour, and challenge them to adopt a new course of action. This goes hand in hand with a confrontation between the diverse cultural strategies and views of reality. 5Living complexes do not follow the mechanistic ideas of the old physics. The manifestations of life emerge and vanish in a highly dynamic flow of interactions. In this way, reality is created in a permanent transformative process. The description of ecology, biological and cultural plurality, and human impacts on nature, demands the describing and consequent inclusion of the in-betweens and go-betweens (Turnbull, D. 2004), of aspects of an inter-connected relatedness that are not measurable. Within such intelligence, the aspects of fuzziness and uncertainty are indivisibly integrated in the comprehension of nature, life and ecology. The consequences for actions and strategies from the local to the global level are presumably drastic, calling for a re-orientation in economic, political, socio-cultural and ecological matters. 6Since the 15th century, a narrow, centralistic world view, which strives to iron out all differences between diverse philosophical outlooks and create homogeneity, has come to dominate as never before. This can be seen especially clearly in the colonisation of virtually the entire known world by western European powers. This was followed by the one-sided monopolisation of the spiritual, living and material resources of our Earth by the European-style power centres. 7These strategies and ways of thinking, adapted all over the world, and the view of humanity that is closely connected with them, have a causal link with the materialistic-mechanistic world view that is still favoured around the globe, i.e. the object-related division of life resulting from the desire to control it (frequently referred to as the Cartesian-Newtonian world view). 8At the start of the modern era, in the 17th century, the changes wrought by the Cartesian revolution engendered diverse and far-reaching processes of social restructuring. This intellectual and philosophical change, having matured for some time, also began to affect the nature of economic activity and the organisation of the state. Put simply, a “God-given” world order was replaced by an impression of unlimited power to shape the world. This brought with it a materialistic view of reality and reduced the relationship between humans and nature to one concerned first and foremost with the production of energy and materials.

#### The Alternative is to take a reality check – energy production follows a stringent line of historical reasoning believing that the next energy revolution will save everything – however through the alternative we can think historically to understand the massive inequalities and violence necessary for the energy regime

**Byrne and Toly 2k6** (john, Noah, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse” Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, And Society in Conflict. Eds John Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover. Pgs 1-32. Transaction Publishers. )

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system’s operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings—almost one-third of the planet’s population—experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact—and sometimes exacerbated—social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smil, 2003: 370 - 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the New York Times 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “havenots.” 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ...an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment. Modernity’s formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity’s supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era’s social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the “democraticauthoritarian bargain” (1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce “every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority” on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford’s work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

### 1NC 2

#### The United States federal government should phase out all current energy subsidies and incentives and ban future energy subsidies and incentives

#### Temporary, diminishing incentives are vital to inducing competition, technological innovation and ending subsidy dependence

**Jenkins, 12** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, Congressional Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 5/22, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=31b79a1a-83a0-4ae6-8c80-30fe754ad0ea>)

Recognizing that investment horizons, technology development cycles, and market conditions vary across advanced energy technology segments, precise policy mechanisms will likely differ from sector to sector. Yet whether through production or investment subsidies, consumer rebates, market-­‐creating regulations or standards, or other market incentives, we recommend that any advanced energy deployment subsidies meet the following policy design criteria. Reformed policies should:

1. ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE MARKET. Deployment policies should create market opportunities for advanced clean energy technologies while fostering competition between technology firms.

2. DRIVE COST REDUCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS. Deployment policies should create market incentives and structures that demand and reward continual improvement in technology performance and cost.

3. PROVIDE TARGETED AND TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR MATURING TECHNOLOGIES. Deployment policies must not operate in perpetuity, but rather should be terminated if technology segments either fail to improve in price and performance or become competitive without subsidy.

4. REDUCE SUBSIDY LEVELS IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGY COSTS. Deployment incentives should decline as technologies improve in price and performance to both conserve limited taxpayer and consumer resources and provide clear incentives for continued technology improvement.

5. AVOID TECHNOLOGY LOCK-OUT AND PROMOTE A DIVERSE ENERGY PORTFOLIO. Deployment incentives should be structured to create market opportunities for energy technologies at different levels of maturity, including new market entrants, to ensure that each has a chance to mature while allowing technologies of similar maturity levels to compete amongst themselves.

6. PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS CERTAINTY. While deployment incentives should be temporary, they must still provide sufficient certainty to support key business decisions by private firms and investors.

7. MAXIMIZE THE IMPACT OF TAXPAYER RESOURCES AND PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE PRIVATE CAPITAL. Deployment incentives should be designed to avoid creating unnecessarily high transaction costs while opening up clean tech investment to broader private capital markets.

#### The CP prevents the collapse of the energy bubble – avoids economic collapse

**Swezey, 11** – project director for The Breakthrough Institute (Devon, “Clean Tech Sector Heading for a Major Crash” 7/11, <http://blacklistednews.com/?news_id=14600&print=1>)

The global clean energy industry is set for a major crash. The reason is simple. Clean energy is still much more expensive and less reliable than coal or gas, and in an era of heightened budget austerity the subsidies required to make clean energy artificially cheaper are becoming unsustainable.

Clean tech crashes are nothing new. The U.S. wind energy industry has collapsed three times before, first in the mid 1990s and most recently in 2002 and 2004 when Congress failed to extend the tax credit that made it profitable. But the impact and magnitude of the coming clean tech crash will far outstrip those of past years.

As part of its effort to combat the economic recession, the federal government pumped nearly $80 billion in direct investment and tax credits into the clean energy sector, catalyzing an unprecedented industry expansion. Solar energy, for example, grew 67% in the United States in 2010. The U.S. wind energy industry also experienced unprecedented growth as a result of the generous Section 1603 clean energy stimulus program. The industry grew by 40% and added 10 GW of new turbines in 2009. Yet many of the federal subsidies that have driven such rapid growth are set to expire in the next few years, and clean energy remains unable to compete without them.

The crash won't be limited to the United States. In many European countries, clean energy subsidies have become budget casualties as governments attempt to curb mounting deficits. Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the Czech Republic have all announced cuts to clean energy subsidies.

Such cuts are not universal, however. China, flush with cash, is bucking the trend, committing $760 billion over 10 years for clean energy projects. China is continuing to invest in low-carbon energy as a way of meeting its voracious energy demand, diversifying its electricity supply, and alleviating some of the negative health consequences of its reliance on fossil energy.

If U.S. and European clean energy markets collapse while investment continues to ramp up in China, the short-term consequences will likely be a migration of much of the industry to Asia. As we wrote in our 2009 report, "Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant," this would have significant economic consequences for the United States, as the jobs, revenues and other benefits of clean tech growth accrue overseas.

In the long-term, however, clean energy must become much cheaper and more reliable if it is to widely displace fossil fuels on the scale of national economies and become a commercially viable industry.

Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle

Why is the United States still locked in this self-perpetuating boom-bust cycle in clean energy? The problem, according to a new essay by energy experts David Victor and Kassia Yanosek in this week's Foreign Affairs, is that our system of clean energy subsidization is jury-rigged to support the deployment of only the least-risky and most mature clean energy technologies, while lacking clear incentives for continual innovation that could make clean energy competitive on cost with conventional energy sources. Rather, we should "invest in more innovative technologies that stand a better chance of competing with conventional energy sources over the long haul." According to Victor and Yanosek, nearly seven-eighths of global clean energy investment goes toward deploying existing technologies that aren't competitive without subsidy, while only a small share goes to encouraging innovation in existing technologies or developing new ones.

This must change. Rather than simply subsidize production of current technologies, we need a comprehensive energy innovation strategy to develop, manufacture, and deploy riskier but more promising clean energy technologies that may eventually compete with fossil energy at scale. Instead of rewarding companies for building the same product, we should reward companies who continuously improve designs and cut costs over time.

Such a federal strategy will require major federal investments, but of a different kind than the subsidies that have driven the clean tech industry in years past. For starters, we must dramatically ramp up funding for early-stage clean energy research and development. A growing bipartisan group of think tanks and business leaders have pushed an investment of at least $15 billion annually in energy R&D, up from its current $4 billion level.

Targeted funding is needed to solve technology challenges and ensure that innovative technologies can develop and improve. One key program that helps fulfill this need is ARPA-E, which funds a portfolio of innovative technology companies and helps connect them with private investors. But ARPA-E's budget has continually been under assault in budget negotiations, hampering its ability to catalyze innovation in the energy sector and limiting its impact.

We also need to invest in cutting-edge advanced manufacturing capabilities and shared technology infrastructure that would help U.S. companies cut costs and improve manufacturing processes. As the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology wrote in a report released last week, manufacturing is vital to innovation, "because of the synergies created by locating production processes and design processes near to each other." Furthermore, bringing down manufacturing costs, such as by supporting shared infrastructure for small firms, or offering financing for the adoption of innovative technologies in manufacturing, will be a key component of reducing the costs of new clean energy innovations.

Lastly, the nation's hodgepodge of energy deployment subsidies is in dire need of reform. As Breakthrough and colleagues wrote in "Post-Partisan Power," we need an energy deployment regime that demands and rewards innovation, rather than just supporting more of the same. Brookings' Mark Muro (a co-author or PPP) expands, "targeted and competitive deployment incentives could be created for various classes of energy technologies that would ensure that each has a chance to mature even as each is challenged to innovate and locate price declines." Rather than create permanently subsidized industries, such investments would "provide the opportunity for opportunity for all emerging low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs," while speeding commercialization.

It is clear that the current budgetary environment in the United States presents challenges to the viability of the fast-growing clean energy industry. But it also presents an opportunity. By repurposing existing clean energy policies and investing in clean energy innovation, the United States can be the first country to make clean energy cheap and reliable, a distinction that is sure to bring major economic benefits in a multi-trillion dollar energy market.

### 1NC 3

#### Oil prices will stabilize now – prices will stick above OPEC break-even levels without significant changes

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### Nuclear power reduces oil dependence – displaces oil power generation, powers maritime and ground transportation, and causes hydrogen transition

ANS 2012; American Nuclear Society, Top 10 Myths about Nuclear Energyhttp://www.new.ans.org/pi/resources/myths/

Myth # 10: Nuclear energy can't reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Truth: Nuclear-generated electricity powers electric trains and subway cars as well as autos today. It has also been used in propelling ships for more than 50 years. That use can be increased since it has been restricted by unofficial policy to military vessels and ice breakers. In the near-term, nuclear power can provide electricity for expanded mass-transit and plug-in hybrid cars. Small modular reactors can provide power to islands like Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Nantucket and Guam that currently run their electrical grids on imported oil. In the longer-term, nuclear power can directly reduce our dependence on foreign oil by producing hydrogen for use in fuel cells and synthetic liquid fuels.

#### High prices are key to the Russian economy and domestic stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, **civil war is likely**.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. **A major power** like Russia -- even though in decline -- **does not suffer civil war quietly or alone**. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke **opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### 1NC 4

#### Obama PC high now – GOP softening now on fiscal cliff – but it will be a fight

Kimberly Atkins (writer for the Boston-Herald) November 8, 2012 “Prez returns to D.C. with more clout” http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends. In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past. “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them.

#### Ensures compromise now – but re-election PC is finite

Ron Kampeas (writer for Intermountain Jewish News) November 7, 2012 “Obama’s second term: More of the same, at least until Iran flares” http://www.ijn.com/presidential-elections/2012-presidential-elections/3530-obamas-second-term-more-of-the-same-at-least-until-iran-flares

The fiscal cliff and specifically sequestration is a major concern," Daroff said. "Our concern continues to be that as the nation and our political leaders continue to assess how to make cuts in spending that those cuts don't fall disproportionately on vulnerable populations that rely upon social service agencies that depend on our funding." Cuts of about 8.5 percent would immediately affect the viability of housing for the elderly, according to officials at B'nai B'rith International, which runs a network of homes. Officials at Jewish federations say the cuts also would curb the meals and transportation for the elderly they provide with assistance from federal programs. Obama and Congress would have had to deal with heading off sequestration in any case, but as a president with a veto-wielding mandate of four more years, he has the leverage to head off deep cuts to programs that his top officials have said remain essential, including food assistance to the poor and medical entitlements for the poor and elderly. David Makovsky, a senior analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Obama's priorities would be domestic. "While a victory in the second term tends to give you some political capital, capital is still finite," he said, citing George W. Bush's failure in 2005 to reform Social Security, despite his decisive 2004 triumph. "This suggests to me the president will keep his focus on the economy and health care," and not on major initiatives in the Middle East.

#### Nuclear power costs political capital

Mariotte 6/5/12 (Michael Mariotte, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is **divided on the issue**. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines. It § Marked 15:03 § is also clear that the American public does not see nuclear power as a “clean energy” source (nor, for that matter, “clean” coal or natural gas fracking). Congressional or state efforts to include these technologies in a “clean energy standard” or a clean energy bank concept are **bound to fail.**

#### Impact is global econ collapse

Harold Mandel (writer for the Examiner) September 27, 2012 “Fitch says fiscal cliff could set off global recession (Video)” http://www.examiner.com/article/fitch-says-fiscal-cliff-could-set-off-global-recession

The ratings agency stated, "The U.S. fiscal cliff represents the single biggest near-term threat to a global economic recovery." Fitch has gone on to warn, “A U.S. fiscal shock would be exported to the rest of the world via a sharply weaker U.S. dollar and asset prices, lower U.S. price and wage inflation and heightened risk of deflation, and the impact on commodity prices.” In the meantime leading U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years, with a primary reason being fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. And so unless the fiscal cliff is confronted and avoided this could be bad news for everyone.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### 1NC – Nuclear Leadership

#### ­­The US can’t prevent proliferation.

Mez, ‘12

[Lutz, senior Associate Professor at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität Berlin, and managing director of the Environmental Policy Research Centre, “Nuclear energy – any solution for sustainability and climate protection?” Energy Policy, Science Direct]

Viewed in historical terms, military use of nuclear energy has gone hand in hand with the development of civil nuclear technology, because most countries attached first priority to the development of nuclear weapons and other military uses, with production of energy in nuclear power plants at first only being a waste product. This by-product developed its own momentum, however: nuclear power became an icon for clean, highly modern technology and technological progress. Moreover, it was a risk-free, highly profitable business for operators of plants because governments paid considerable sums in subsidies and producers could pass on costs to electrical power customers. Branches of the economy which are the most intensive users of electrical power profited from cheap nuclear power —as did the militaries in countries with nuclear weapons—because civil nuclear facilities offer many possibilities for military use.¶ The borderlines between military and civil nuclear technology and thus between war and peace are often hazy (Mez et al., 2010). In order to minimize the risks of military use, regulation of civil use of nuclear energy have been contemplated within a multilateral framework for some time. The idea of establishing an international atomic energy agency (IAEA), to which states are to transfer uranium stocks and other fissionable material, was proposed by former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Atoms for Peace speech3 as far back as 1953 and during the first Geneva atomic conference in 1955. The purpose of the IAEA was to develop methods to ensure that fissionable nuclear material can be used by humankind in a peaceful manner—in agriculture, medicine and energy production for countries and regions of the world with limited energy resources. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970, constituted an attempt to prevent nuclear beggarsfrom becoming nuclear powers through civil nuclear technology transfer. In reality, however, a series of countries including Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have obtained nuclear weapons under the pretext of civil use of nuclear power, while other countries such as Iran are accused of having this same intention. This development shows that it is difficult to prevent nuclear weapons from being built and that there is a great likelihood that more and more countries will obtain nuclear capabilities in the future. When a nuclear infrastructure is in place and the basic material for weapons is being produced in facilities for enrichment or reprocessing—in military reactors, dual-purpose reactors or fast breeder-reactors—then it is merely a question of political will and willingness to invest in nuclear technology which decides whether a country develops nuclear weapons or not.

#### Nuclear leadership is impossible -- US arsenal creates hypocrisy and international resentment.

Perkovich, ‘8

[George, vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” October, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons.pdf]

This Brief summarizes four security interests that would be served by making the longterm project of abolishing nuclear weapons a central purpose of U.S. policy: preventing proliferation; preventing nuclear terrorism; reducing toward zero the unique threat of nuclear annihilation; and fostering optimism regarding U.S. global leadership. Each of these objectives can be (and has been) pursued without the larger purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons. However, the chances of success will steadily diminish if the few nuclear-armed states try to perpetuate a discriminatory order based on haves and have-nots and if they enforce it firmly against some states and hollowly against others. Such inequity breeds noncooperation and resistance when what is needed now is cooperation to prevent proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and the failure of deterrence. Why should everyone cooperate in enforcing a system that looks like it was designed to favor just a few?

#### Institutional inertia prevents any international leadership.

#### Wellen, ‘9

[Russ, a Scholars & Rogues blogger and a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor, 1-12, “Abdicating U.S. Nonproliferation Leadership,” Foreign Policy In Focus]

This is merely the last item in a list of leadership failures. Under the Bush administration, the United States has maintained much of its nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert, refused to renounce first-use, and sought to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons. Also, we've signed a preliminary deal to station interceptor missiles in Poland. Ostensibly intended as a defense against Iranian missiles, it's perceived as a threat by Russia, which reacted by moving missiles of its own to its border with Poland. It's natural to assume that the momentum behind these policies will decline with the Bush administration. But in reality, the engine of nuclear proliferation is a perpetual motion machine: Militaristic think tanks never stop generating strategies and networking. The think tank that's most active promoting nuclear weapons, as well as missile defense, is the National Institute of Public Policy. A product of the Reagan years, NIPP and its President, Keith Payne, later produced a study titled "Rationale and Requirements for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control," which served as a blueprint for the Bush administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. But in the years between Reagan’s and George W. Bush’s presidencies, organizations like the Smith Richardson Foundation provided NIPP with grants that enabled it to continue its work advocating missile defense and withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It still does. Following closely is the Center for Security Policy (CSP), headed by Frank Gaffney, the hard-right ideologue whose columns scorch the Web. During the last Democratic administration, it circulated a famous letter signed by neocons far and wide urging former President Bill Clinton to attack Iraq. It also played key roles in the two Rumsfeld Commissions (one promoted missile defense; the other, space weapons), and was instrumental in abolishing the government's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Meanwhile, the conservative Heritage Foundation is trying to generate buzz for a documentary it's releasing early in 2009 entitled 33 Minutes, which is intended to promote (or scare viewers into acquiescing to) missile defense. Finally, in a recent interview, William Kristol intimated that the Democrats' rise to power might call for a new PNAC. The original Project for a New American Century, founded by Kristol and Robert Kagan during the Clinton years, called for the United States, dominant since the demise of the Cold War, to become a "benevolent hegemony" via, when necessary, the preemptive use of force. Also, in a recurrent conservative theme, PNAC condemned arms controllers for concentrating on getting rid of weapons, rather than the regimes that possessed them. Disarmament in Name Alone The studies, papers, and articles militaristic think tanks and individuals produce are critical for their efforts to undermine arms control while advocating weapons systems. In a policy brief for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace entitled "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead," George Perkovich wrote that, in recent years, U.S. officials "sometimes invoke lawyerly arguments either to dispute the nature of the disarmament obligation under the NPT or to argue that it is being met." A perfect example is a piece by Christopher Ford, the Bush administration's special representative for nuclear nonproliferation — until, that is, he recently resigned and himself joined a militaristic think tank, the Hudson Institute. Published by the Nonproliferation Review in November 2007 — oddly enough, the organ of an arms control organization — "Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" is basically a handbook of the objections conservatives have to the NPT and treaties in general, as well as their techniques for sabotaging them. With a new Democratic president, one might be inclined to dismiss such concerns. But the tricks conservatives use to defend a Republican president for dragging his feet on nonproliferation, as well as obstructing it, are the same they will use to cast an administration that dares to be sympathetic to the NPT as soft on security.

No nuclear power expansion now – claims of a renaissance are overblown

**Becker, 7/23/12** [Becker is chairman of the Koeberg Alert Alliance, “PETER BECKER: Nuclear industry ‘rebirth’ is instead stillborn”, <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=176811>]

THE nuclear power industry is deeply troubled, with little cause for optimism. There is growing worldwide public resistance to nuclear power stations, US President Barack Obama has terminated government subsidies for nuclear power, and Germany and Switzerland have committed to shutting down all their reactors. While the renewable energy industry has seen dramatic growth and constantly falling costs, the nuclear industry grapples with spiralling costs, the seemingly intractable waste-disposal issue, and the huge economic and human costs of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. We have heard from the nuclear lobby that a "nuclear renaissance" is just around the corner and, as evidence of this, we are told 65 reactors are "under construction" worldwide. Examination of this list reveals some interesting details. The International Atomic Energy Association maintains a database of all commercial reactors, the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS). In March this year, it listed 65 reactors as "under construction". It is instructive to look at the number of years some of these have been "under construction". For example, Lungmen 1 and 2 in China were begun in 1997 and have so far taken 15 years to build. In the Slovak Republic, construction of Mochovce 3 and 4 was started in 1987, making 25 years so far. For Atucha 2 in Argentina, it’s 31 years. Moving from the disappointing to the ludicrous, Watts Bar 2 in the US has been "under construction" since 1972. It is likely these long-delayed projects will eventually be cancelled, and almost certainly they will never be an economic success. Even if they are ever completed, the designs will be frighteningly outdated and their safety features unlikely to satisfy current regulatory requirements or public concerns. It is therefore disingenuous to include these in a list of "success stories" about nuclear power. Eliminating the reactors that have been "under construction" for 15 years or more reduces the list of 65 to 52. Another item in the PRIS data is the estimated start-up year. It is interesting that for many of these reactors across South Korea, India, France, Brazil and China, the PRIS database does not list an estimated start-up year. It is unusual, to say the least, for a construction project to have no estimated completion date. This can be interpreted as either a lack of commitment to the project or a sign that problems have arisen that will delay construction. These can hardly be considered success stories and eliminating them from the list of 52 reactors leaves just 10 reactors. Of these 10, most are in pairs and they are spread over six different nuclear plants. And of these plants, only two (Vogtle in the US and Flamville in France) are in the West. What is more, Vogtle is likely to be the last nuclear plant built in the US and was viable only because of subsidies from the Bush administration. Another statistic offered by the World Nuclear Association is that nuclear power is being "considered" by 45 countries that do not currently use it. At first glance, this seems to be impressive evidence of the nuclear "renaissance". However, any country that is considering using nuclear power is, by definition of the word "considering", also considering not using it. An analysis of the 45 countries reveals interesting examples. It includes Namibia and Mongolia, which both consume about 3000GWh a year. A small nuclear power station such as Koeberg, if operated at 80% capacity, would produce more than 12000 GWh a year. Is it likely any country will pay for generating capacity that will produce more than four times the electricity they need? Including these countries in the "considering" list is a distortion of the facts by the World Nuclear Association, perhaps born of a desperation to conceal the decline of the industry. Nuclear power plants are very long-term commitments. It is therefore important to have a healthy global nuclear industry in place so that services such as maintenance, spare parts, decontamination after a leak, plant decommissioning and waste handling are available at reasonable prices when they are required, decades from now. The sad truth is that even according to the optimistic International Atomic Energy Agency data from the PRIS data, the number of reactors on which construction was started fell 75% from 2010 to last year, and again 75% from last year to this year. Far from a renaissance, this is a catastrophic collapse. SA would do well to wait a few years to see if this trend reverses before locking itself into the nuclear energy option.

Kagan exaggerates

**Macdonald and Parent 11** \* Paul-**Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/ December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”** <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment>]

Despite the erosion of U.S. military and economic dominance, many observers warn that a rapid departure from the current approach to foreign policy would be disastrous. The historian Robert Kagan cautions that "a reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation." The journalist Robert Kaplan even more apocalyptically warns that "lessening [the United States'] engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity." But these defenders of the status quo confuse retrenchment with appeasement or isolationism. A prudent reduction of the United States' overseas commitments would not prevent the country from countering dangerous threats and engaging with friends and allies. Indeed, such reductions would grant the country greater strategic flexibility and free resources to promote long-term growth. A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses -- the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall. Nor is there good evidence that reducing Washington's overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the forces' repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship between Washington and Seoul. Calls for Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese forces. Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and falling dominoes. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent and ideological disputes remarkably mild.

### China

No indo pak war **No extinction – minimal radiation damage**

**Williscroft** in ’0**2** (R.G., Former NOAA Officer and Commentator for Defense Watch, “Don't Fear an India-Pakistan Nuclear War”, June 12, http://www.sftt.us/dw06122002.html#4)

What might be the consequences of such an exchange? We have only one historical example against which we can measure potential damage from a nuclear strike. Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "paper cities," in the sense that a large portion of the residential areas consisted of flimsy traditional Japanese domestic dwellings constructed of light wood and paper. The architectural infrastructure of likely target areas in both Pakistan and India are dramatically different. This opens our analysis to significant speculation, since brick-and-mortar structures can absorb a lot more blast energy than paper and wood, and offer dramatically increased protection against radiation. Furthermore, modern nukes typically do not produce as much hard radiation as their ancestors, except for specifically designed "neutron" devices. These are designed to produce a high-level flood of initial high energy neutrons intended to kill living beings quickly and efficiently, while leaving as much infrastructure intact as possible. Both India and Pakistan would gain the greatest benefit from neutron devices, because of the very large armies each can deploy on short notice. Intelligence estimates indicate, however, that only Pakistan is likely to have a neutron device, but the evidence is circumstantial, based primarily on the certain knowledge that Pakistan has received material assistance from China, and it is likely that China has such devices. From intelligence estimates we know that Pakistan probably has 15 or so nuclear devices, based upon its ability to manufacture highly enriched uranium, which forms the basis of its nuclear program. They all may be sufficiently small to fit inside their ballistic missiles, and at least half may be neutron devices. India may have as many as 50 nukes based upon its ability to produce weapons grade plutonium, employed by its design. These devices probably range from relatively unsophisticated devices manufactured in the 1970s to fairly complex systems of recent manufacture. From these numbers one can assume that a total nuclear exchange might produce over 40 actual nuclear explosions, which assumes an Indian preemptive strike followed by full-scale retaliation by Pakistan, with 60-70 percent of the weapons actually exploding with a yield near their design parameters. If one assumes that the Pakistani devices are primarily anti-personnel weapons, the overall projections regarding death and destruction are significantly less than the numbers typically tossed around by politicians and journalists ignorant of nuclear weapons effects. Instead of 20 million killed in the first two or three exchanges, it is much more likely that the number of those killed will range from the high hundreds of thousands to the low millions, depending on whether the Indian bombers make it through Pakistani defenses to Islamabad. Because all the devices on both sides are relatively modern when compared with the bombs dropped on Japan, the global impact will be relatively small. Regional fallout will follow local wind patterns. Sensitive measuring devices will be able to pick up radioactive debris on a worldwide basis during the following months, but only because of the distinctive character of this fallout. The level will be well below normal background radiation from the sun and cosmic rays, **and will pose absolutely no hazard to world populations.** While a nuclear exchange would be horrific to the soldiers and civilians caught in the cross-fire and would vastly complicate our ongoing war on terror, the one thing Americans, Europeans and most of the rest of the world don't have to worry about is radiation poisoning from such an exchange. Obviously, we would lose Pakistan as an active partner in our ongoing Afghanistan operations, but other than a place from which to launch, it is arguable whether we are getting any other real value from our partnership anyway. Whatever complications we would experience in prosecuting our offensive against al Qaeda, they would experience in spades. An international effort would certainly mount to assist survivors. We would clearly be part of that effort, and this would tend to distract us from the reason we are there in the first place. Since the probable outcome of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would be considerably smaller than current public perceptions, our level of involvement would also be significantly smaller. Ironically, if the Pakistanis rely on neutron devices, which really do very little damage to the surrounding countryside, the net effect may be far less hungry mouths impacting a food supply that will not be very much different than before the conflict. Within two or three weeks following such an exchange, the world should come to realize that the situation really is not so catastrophic. The world stock markets should recover quickly, and most of the world probably will go back to business as usual.

**War in Asia is highly unlikely—regional stability concerns are being settled and alliance structures check**

**Desker and Bitzinger 2008** – \*Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, \*\*Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (Richard and Barry, Survival 50:6, "Why East Asian War is Unlikely", pages 105-28, EBSCO, WEA)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

**Multiple alt causes to Indopak arms races**

**Krepon 2008** – founder of the Stimson Center, Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia (Michael, “Nuclear Arms and the Future of South Asia,” Joint Force Quarterly, Iss. 53, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\_pages/editions/i53/9.pdf#search=%22%27nuclear%20arms%20and%20the%20future%20of%20south%20asia%22, WEA)

The nuclear arms competition between Pakistan and India has an additional driver: Chinese reactions to U.S. national security policies that seek “decisive” victory in the event of warfare with China over Taiwan. Beijing has long pursued what, in Cold War terms, has been a lackadaisical strategic modernization program. This relaxed pace is changing. The Bush administration’s incorporation of conventional strike capabilities into strategic war plans, the proposed deployment of more than 40 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, the revised U.S. Air Force guidance related to space superiority, and other military initiatives have gained Beijing’s attention, as they have particular relevance vis-à-vis contingencies related to Taiwan.

The accelerating pace of China’s strategic modernization programs will feed into India’s calculations for a minimal nuclear deterrent, which in turn will feed into Pakistan’s perceived needs. **The China-IndiaPakistan nuclear triangle is likely to be the primary axis of vertical proliferation** over the next 10 years or more. While this competition will fall well short of an arms race—at least in Cold War terms—it will work against nuclear stabilization on the subcontinent.

The fourth dominant trend is that internal security concerns will continue to be paramount for both Pakistan and India. Pakistan’s domestic cohesion is being stressed by several separate but mutually reinforcing factors, including the strains generated by prolonged military rule, the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the difficulties generated by being an ally of the Bush administration in its war on terror. Tensions between provinces and Islamabad have been acute under military rule. Competing demands over resources, particularly water, are likely to exacerbate these tensions in the future. Pakistan’s leaders also must work toward ameliorating sectarian and communal friction.

**The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now**

**Layne 11** (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at  Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. “Bye bye, Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 <http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana>) AK

American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. **Those days are gone forever**. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. **Even in the best case**, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. **If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable**. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. § Marked 15:07 § If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and **the Pax Americana will end**. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S. created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. Indeed, **the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion**.

### 1NC – Econ

**Studies and empirics prove no war impact**

**Miller, 2k** (Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the **conventional wisdom** about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

**No conflict can be explained by the current crisis**

**Barnett, 9** (Thomas, Distinguished Scholar and Author at the Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy at the University of Tennessee, May, “The New Rules: The Good News on the Global Financial Downturn”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3805)

When the global financial contagion kicked in last fall, the blogosphere was quick to predict that a sharp uptick in global instability would soon follow. While we're not out of the woods yet, it's interesting to note just how little instability -- and not yet a single war -- has actually resulted from the worst global economic downturn since the Great Depression. Run a Google search for "global instability" and you'll get 23 million hits. But when it comes to actual conflicts, the world is humming along at a level that reflects the steady decline in wars -- by 60 percent -- that we've seen since the Cold War's end. As George Mason University's Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) notes, that trend applies within the Muslim world, too, so even America's "war on terror" has not quite lived up to the pessimists' expectations. Wikipedia's page for "ongoing conflicts" cites a whopping seven wars with annual death rates of 1,000-plus. And they're all familiar situations: Arabs-Israel, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan and Mexico. None have been helped by the financial crisis, but all predate it. Iraq's § Marked 15:07 § internal situation has actually improved, despite slumping oil revenue. And as for fears that Mexico might soon become a "failed state," that government's recent response to the swine flu indicates otherwise. The CSP's database lists only three new conflicts since 2008 -- Russia-Georgia, Kenya and southern Sudan. None can be blamed on the global economy. Meanwhile, Colombia's internal security has improved dramatically, and Sri Lanka's stubborn separatist movement just collapsed. Yes, we suffer from Somali piracy, and American and Chinese subs continue their cat-and-mouse games off China's otherwise quiet coast. Still, many expected more from a financial panic that, according to the IMF, erased roughly 6 percent of global GDP: Beijing and Washington locking horns, for instance, instead of letting Taiwan negotiate peace with the mainland. But disappointment abounds for the doom-and-gloomers: - Instead of coming apart at the seams, China implemented a stimulus package that seems to be working at home and abroad (see America's construction industry exports). Beijing's flagship companies have exploited the crisis for the extraordinary buying opportunities it has created, locking in long-term commodity and energy contracts in exchange for much-needed cash. Meanwhile its central bank has swapped $100 billion worth of currency with major trade partners. - Asia's big powers should be at each other's throats over sea-based energy deposits, or at least over North Korea. And yet recently we've witnessed the first China-Japan-South Korea summit, followed soon after by the creation of a $120-billion liquidity fund to help out their smaller neighbors. - India's Congress Party just won a decisive victory in national elections, allowing it to rule without relying on anti-globalizing elements like its native Communist party. Expect another young Gandhi to champion India's next round of reforms. - The EU definitely regrets its fast integration of all those now-shaky Eastern European economies. And yet, as Washington Post economic columnist Steve Pearlstein recently noted, ". . . the real story in Europe may be how firmly market liberalization seems to have taken hold. Not only have there been few, if any, calls for renationalizations, but some countries are still moving toward privatization and reregulation. Instances of protectionism are outweighed by the examples of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that have been accepted as a matter of course . . ." - In the Middle East, the Arab world's biggest state, Egypt, remains committed to opening up its state-heavy economy even more, while Arab sovereign wealth funds continue their aggressive investment in Africa, where China and India's portfolios also grow. - In Latin America, market-friendly forces (e.g., Brazil's Lula) are gaining steam, while market-hostile ones (e.g., Venezuela's Chávez) lose traction. - Even "axis of diesel" Russia has quieted down considerably over the past nine months, with Vladimir Putin's hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, slowly emerging as a force of level-headed moderation. Add it all up and it's clear that assessments such as "the world is in chaos" -- a David Rothkopf beauty -- just don't fly. Periodic riots do not an Armageddon make.

### 1NC – Solvency

#### Loan guarantees fail -- current allocated funds aren’t used up -- industry slowdown means no demand.

Wald, ‘11

[Matthew L., NYT, 4-28, “Despite Bipartisan Support, Nuclear Reactor Projects Falter,” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/business/energy-environment/29utility.html]

WASHINGTON — In an effort to encourage nuclear power, Congress voted in 2005 to authorize $17.5 billion in loan guarantees for new reactors. Now, six years later, with the industry stalled by poor market conditions and the Fukushima disaster, nearly half of the fund remains unclaimed. And yet Congress, at the request of the Obama administration, is preparing to add $36 billion in nuclear loan guarantees to next year’s budget. Even supporters of the technology doubt that new projects will surface any time soon to replace those that have been all but abandoned. “My gut feeling is that there is going to be a delay,” said Neil Wilmshurst, a vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute, a nonprofit utility consortium based in Palo Alto, Calif. News on Thursday that Exelon Corporation, the nation’s largest reactor operator, planned to buy a rival, the Constellation Energy Group, only reinforces the trend; until late last year, Constellation wanted to build, while Exelon was firmly against it. Mr. Wilmshurst said the continued depressed price of natural gas had clouded the economics of new reactors, and he predicted that construction activity would “go quiet” for two to five years. His group has shifted its efforts to helping figure out how existing plants can extend their licenses to 80 years from the current limit of 60. Of the four nuclear reactor construction projects that the Energy Department identified in 2009 as the most deserving for the loans, two have lost major partners and seem unlikely to recover soon. In addition to low prices for natural gas, the demand for electricity is down, and the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant could bring new rules. Only $8.8 billion of the 2005 guarantee has been allocated — to a twin reactor project in Georgia. Ground has been broken on the fourth candidate, a twin reactor project in South Carolina, but its sponsors may get a better deal in the commercial finance market.

#### The structure of loan guarantees is the problem -- the aff doesn’t resolve that.

**Gale et al., ‘9**

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The several energy and climate change bills pending before Congress provide the perfect opportunity to re-examine the loan guarantee program. If properly implemented, the loan guarantee program can be used to incentivize project level non-recourse financing for nuclear plant construction and can create lower average costs of construction. However, the loan guarantee program must be structured properly to meet these goals. In particular, as specified above and as recognized by the DOE and the Senate in the proposed amendments to the loan guarantee regulations, we believe it is vital to the loan guarantee program‘s efficiency that the federal government be viewed as sharing in the same risks as private lenders in order to maximize the program‘s ability to motivate private lenders to invest in projects that present those very risks. If the DOE assumes a superpriority position relative to other lenders, private investors may feel that the government does not have sufficient ―skin in the game‖ to give them comfort that the unique risks associated with investing in a new nuclear power project are perceived by the federal government to be manageable. These issues are discussed in more detail in Section II.D.2.c below.